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Abstract 
Explicit measures of environmental views can be affected by social desirability and cognitive 
biases. Implicit measures, which should avoid such issues, have previously faced difficulty in 
establishing balanced and representative stimuli. Recently, measuring environmental views has 
shifted towards using environmental values, rather than attitudes. Accordingly, this paper 
outlines a novel approach to implicit measures of environmental views using the Implicit 
Association Task (IAT). Stimuli representing Egoistic and Biospheric value orientations were 
selected, having positive valance and categorical representation. Across three independent 
samples (total n = 293), this Environment IAT (1) showed expected positive correlations with 
explicit measures of environmental values and attitudes, (2) reflected significant differences 
between environmentalists and non-environmentalists, and (3) was a unique predictor of 
environmentalist status even after controlling for explicit values and attitudes. Implications of 
the Environment IAT suggest a new research approach to environmental preferences for 
predicting behaviour, and the automatic formation of attitudes. 
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Introduction 
To establish how people view issues related to the environment, a wealth of different measures 
have been created; Dunlap and Jones (2002) considered “at least 700-800” (p. 493) published 
measures of environmental views in a comprehensive review. Within the multitude of measures 
of environmental views, one measure has emerged as the most popular: The New 
Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978). The New Environmental Paradigm can 
be seen as a reaction to societal views that focused on promoting economic success and 
materialism – the Dominant Social Paradigm in Dunlap and Van Liere’s (1978) terms. Dunlap 
and Van Liere (1978) formulated 12 questions that challenged facets of the Dominant Social 
Paradigm, measuring attitudes toward ecological limits to growth, preserving the balance of 
nature, and rejecting human exceptionalism over nature. Updated 20 years later, Dunlap, Van 
Liere, Mertig, and Jones (2000) published the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), extended to 
15 questions with additional measures of belief in an eco-crisis, and whether industry was 
exempt from ecological concerns. Since the original publication, the old and revised scales have 
become the most popular measures of environmental worldviews, with good evidence of cross-
cultural applicability and validity (Dunlap, 2008; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010).  
 Despite the impressive history of the NEP, recent research suggests a shift in focus 
from environmental attitudes toward environmental values (Dunlap, 2008; Steg & Nordlund, 
2012). In a recent comparison of values, environmental impact concern, and NEP scores, values 
were generally a stronger predictor of environmental activism, policy acceptance and personal 
norms than attitudes (Steg, De Groot, Dreijerink, Abrahamse, & Siero, 2011). An attitude may 
be defined as “a summary evaluation of an object or thought”, temporarily retrieved from pre-
held views (Bohner & Wänke, 2002, p. 5). Values, on the other hand, are generally seen as a 
more stable long-term construct (Stern, 2000) which, varying in strength, act as guiding 
principles in life (Schwartz, 1992). Values are a useful construct for environmental concern 
because of their efficiency: there are a smaller number of values than environmental topics 
(Dunlap & Jones, 2002), and their abstract nature means the same underlying value can be 
linked to a range of applications (De Groot & Thøgersen, 2012). Another reason to shift focus 
to values is because they are more stable properties of the people being studied. Attitudes are 
effectively products of values (Stern & Dietz, 1994), making values the more fundamental and 
unshifting unit of analysis – in much the same way that it is useful to study the underlying 
cycles of climate when we want to predict the more superficial patterns seen in weather.  
The role of environmental values largely stems from the work of Schwartz (1992, 
1994), who demonstrated the international existence of a two-dimensional framework of 
values. One axis of the two-dimensional grid indicates values for Conservatism (e.g., security 
and tradition) against values relating to Openness to Change (e.g., autonomy and 
independence). The second, orthogonal, axis contrasts Self Enhancement (e.g., personal gain, 
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power and wealth) against Self-Transcendence (e.g., universalism and benevolence) 
orientations (Schwartz, 1994). This second axis is especially important for environmentalism, 
since self-transcendence values have been a useful predictor for environmental behaviours by 
a number of researchers (see De Groot and Steg, 2007). Moreover, a recent meta-analysis 
collating 13 reports of materialistic values (strongly linked to self-enhancement) found a 
moderately strong link between materialism, lower environmental concern and anti-ecological 
behaviour (Hurst, Dittmar, Bond, & Kasser, 2013). 
Expanding the use of values, Stern and colleagues (Stern and Dietz, 1994; Stern, Dietz, 
& Kalof, 1993) proposed an additional value orientation directly related to pro-environmental 
views. In several studies and reviews, they suggested that while people may wish to protect the 
environment for altruistic reasons, they may show concern directly for the environment without 
human interests. Stern and Dietz (1994) offer the example of choosing between protecting 
people’s jobs or protecting historic woodland, both of which are apparently incompatible but 
which would fall under the same self-transcendence value orientation in the original Schwartz 
framework. Amalgamating concepts previously discussed by several authors, Stern and his co-
authors (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern et al., 1993) proposed a tripartite model of value 
orientations to explain environmental behaviour: Egoistic (concern for yourself), Altruistic 
(concern for others), and Biospheric (concern for nature).  
To address a lack of data on such tripartite models, De Groot and Steg (2008) used a 
selection of terms from Schwartz’s (1992) original values to develop a Value Orientation 
measure that allowed for the clear separation between the three values. Their Value Orientation 
measure uses 13 value constructs that participants rate, on a 9-point scale, to indicate how 
important each value construct is to themselves (including a way of indicating the value 
opposed to their own values). The 13 items collapse to give a score for each of the three value 
orientations. The measure has received good support, with results suggesting it is valid across 
five countries (De Groot & Steg, 2007). 
Implicit Approaches to the Environment 
Measures of environmental attitudes and values conventionally use survey-type approaches and 
rely on explicit measures. However, several authors have found people’s responses to climate 
change and environmental issues are easily biased by cognitively available information 
(Durfee, 2006; Joireman, Barnes-Truelove & Duell, 2011; Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2006), 
making the validity of explicit measures of environmental concern questionable. Additionally, 
several authors have suggested that measuring environmental attitudes may be open to social 
desirability biases (Beattie & Sale, 2009; Bruni & Schultz, 2010; Ewert & Galloway, 2009; 
Fischer, Peters, Vávra, Neebe, & Megyesi, 2011; Oerke & Bogner, 2011). Perhaps most 
obviously seen in the phenomenon of “greenwashing” – the promotion of sustainable 
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credentials without actual environmental benefits (Pearse, 2012) – social desirability may also 
influence individual people to promote their beliefs and values as more environmentally 
conscious than they really are when completing surveys. Social desirability bias is often seen 
as two variants: self-deceptive positivity, which distorts a person’s self-presentation, or 
impression management to other people, which is more deliberate and can occur without 
internal change (Paulhus, 1991). It remains unclear whether biases in environmental self-report 
measures can be characterised as self-deceptive positivity (people viewed by Fischer et al., 
2011, as “fallible, but ultimately well-meaning” – p. 1029), or bias for impression management, 
in which people are “green fakers” (Beattie & Sale, 2009, p. 203). It is also possible that explicit 
measures of attitudes and values bias responses because they have a simple prompting effect, 
encouraging people to agree with ideas made cognitively available by the researcher, but which 
they would not have spontaneously raised themselves, thereby artificially increasing apparent 
levels of concern (Hafner, Walker, Verplanken & Skippon, in prepA).  
Investigating this putative social desirability bias may be possible by comparing 
explicit and implicit preferences for environmental issues. De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, 
Spruyt, and Moors (2009) suggest the defining characteristic of implicit measures is that they 
capture automatic assessments of stimuli, rather than reasoned assessments. Typically, implicit 
measures use computer tasks that measure the speed for a person to associate two stimuli, 
inferring that this constitutes an implicit measure of association (Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & 
Sherman, 2010). Measuring a person’s implicit preferences is appealing, since it can avoid 
several complications of conventional explicit measures (Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2010), 
including limits to introspective ability (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007), and issues with 
social desirability bias (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlman, & Banaji, 2009). 
However, in contrast to the range of explicit environmental measures, such as the NEP 
and the de Groot and Steg (2007) Value Orientation measure, there are very few implicit 
measures related to the environment. One implicit measure compared preferences towards 
products with low carbon footprints (e.g., modern fluorescent lightbulbs) against high carbon 
footprints (e.g., older incandescent lightbulbs) as a proxy for environmental concern (Beattie 
& Sale, 2009). However, this approach relies on participants’ awareness of the product’s 
environmentally friendly nature, and some items may have caused confusion (e.g., pineapples 
were compared to apples for the carbon cost of transport, with no certainty that laypeople would 
know about such differences). An alternative measure by Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico, and 
Khazian (2004) examines implicit connectedness to nature. Using a variation of implicit 
methodology, participants classified words representing ‘nature’ (e.g., birds, trees) or ‘built’ 
(e.g., factory, street), selected for their “face validity” (Schultz et al., 2004, p. 34). This implicit 
‘connectedness to nature scale’ has seen some positive results; implicit connections to nature 
increased after experiencing pleasant natural environments (Schultz & Tabanico, 2007), and 
5 
 
during typically pleasant seasons (Duffy & Verges, 2010). Yet the measure has been criticised 
for using overly positive items that might skew results in favour of attachment to nature: Verges 
and Duffy (2010) reversed the direction of effects in a series of experiments by using positive 
words for the built environment (e.g., toy, trophy) and negative natural words (e.g., fungus, 
bee). A rebuttal from Bruni, Chance, Schultz, and Nolan (2012), using their own experimental 
manipulation of word valance, suggested no differences or reversal in scores, and this debate is 
likely to continue.  
Complications of environment-based implicit measures largely stem from two factors. 
First, the majority of implicit measures require a binary separation (e.g., Black or White) or a 
continuum (e.g., Rich to Poor) with clearly defined opposites to contrast against (Lane, Banaji, 
Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). Unfortunately, there is no clear opposite to ‘environmental 
concern’, with many related words also lacking clear opposites (consider the word ‘ecology’). 
Research into implicit measure methodology emphasises the importance of categories, and 
misidentification of categories by participants can induce large variations in scores (Brendl, 
Markman, & Messner, 2001; Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2010). The second complication is the 
need for valance-balanced stimuli. People appear to have a bias towards stimuli with positive 
connotations, meaning that category items in an implicit task need to have neutral valence (all 
stimuli evoke neither positive nor negative evaluations) or, at least, balanced valence, such that 
for each positive word in one category there must be an equally positive word in the other 
category. The key issue to avoid would be where the stimuli in one category inadvertently had 
very different connotations to those in the other (e.g., lambs, flowers... used as environmental 
stimuli against filth, squalor... as non-environmental stimuli). Although such examples are 
extreme, this issue has arisen in research, whereby stimuli chosen as counterparts to 
environmental words have strong negative connotations (e.g., pollution, deforestation) which 
can lead to biased results (Verges & Duffy, 2010), and may even reverse the direction of 
implicit measures (Govan & Williams, 2004). 
Given these issues with previous attempts at implicit measures, we suggest that 
progress might be made by shifting attention from attitudes and to value preferences. In 
particular, we note that, given its clear divide between Egoistic and Biospheric values, the work 
by De Groot and Steg (2007, 2008) may serve as the ideal framework to guide development of 
an implicit measure of environmental concern. To the best of our knowledge, there are currently 
no implicit measures based on value orientations. In a conceptual review on value research, 
Maio (2010) notes that researchers have often considered values as conscious, easily accessible 
constructs, but that it may be time to explore them using implicit methods. However, Maio 
(2010) reports three main difficulties in applying implicit methods to value measurement: the 
need for opposing categories, the range of values that fit under one orientation, and the use of 
good/bad in implicit tasks while values are measured on importance. For the first two problems, 
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we believe that the De Groot and Steg (2008) framework can act as the foundation for an 
implicit measure. To create opposing orientations, Egoistic and Biospheric values may reflect 
two contrasting influences on pro-environmental behaviour (de Groot & Steg, 2008), with 
egoistic influences linked to reduced environmental views (Hurst et al., 2013), and that value 
orientations can act in opposition (Maoi, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009). Additionally, in 
order to define the complexity of values in an implicit measure, the items used by de Groot and 
Steg (2007, 2008) provide several items that have successfully represented Egoistic and 
Biospheric orientations, and may be contrasted in an implicit measure.  
The third complication highlighted by Maio (2010) is the use of importance ratings to 
measure values, while implicit measures are often applied using good/bad contrasts (Teige-
Mocigemba et al., 2010). Discussed in more detail in the method section, using basic good/bad 
assessments can capture automatic preferences, while using more complex terms (i.e., 
“important” or “unimportant”) may reduce the effectiveness of implicit measures (Nosek & 
Hansen, 2008). For the purposes of this investigation, a good/bad assessment was applied to 
stimuli, and not ratings of importance, to encourage more automatic responses. This effectively 
means that we cannot claim that such an approach constitutes an implicit measure of values, 
but rather would measure an implicit preference toward value orientations. Though our test 
might not be a direct measure of values, it may nevertheless be possible to infer that a preference 
toward Biospheric values may be linked to greater concern for the environment. 
 In summary, then, we suggest that implicit measures have much to offer the study of 
environmental psychology as they overcome such issues as self-presentation biases, even if 
these are unconscious. Moreover, we suggest that using values rather than attitudes as the basis 
for such a measure (in particular the Value Orientation measure from De Groot and Steg, 2008) 
offers a novel approach to implicit tasks that may prove useful in assessing people’s 
environmental preferences. This paper therefore presents the first investigation into whether 
implicitly measuring preferences for Egoistic and Biospheric values is a feasible approach. 
Method 
For this paper, the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) was selected as the 
implicit method. In brief, the IAT typically requires participants to classify word stimuli into 
two groups. The original version used flowers against insects (targets), and good against bad 
(attributes). In one block of trials, participants paired flower stimuli with ‘good’ stimuli and 
paired insect stimuli with ‘bad’ stimuli. The task then changed, so insect stimuli must be paired 
with ‘good’ stimuli. The speed with which a target can be paired with one attribute is compared 
to the speed with which it can be paired with the opposite attribute to infer implicit preferences. 
A person showing a consistent advantage when pairing rose with good and a consistent 
disadvantage when pairing daffodil with bad, whilst at the same time finding it easy to pair 
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wasp with bad but not beetle with good, would emerge as having an implicit preference for 
flowers over insects.  
 There were three main reasons for using the IAT. First, the IAT has proved extremely 
popular since its inception. Over 450 publications have directly used or evaluated the method 
(Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2010), with a vast amount of research evaluating the methodology 
and verifying IAT results across a range of topics (Greenwald et al., 2009; Hofmann, 
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Second, the IAT appears to outperform 
alternative implicit approaches, reporting larger effect sizes (De Houwer et al., 2009) and with 
stronger reliability and stability (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012). Third, IAT effects are based upon 
parent categories, and are less influenced by the specific stimuli used (De Houwer, 2001; 
Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005) – which is clearly a 
desirable property in a psychometric test. This issue is particularly important here, since we are 
attempting to use the relatively abstract concepts of Egoistic or Biospheric values, which need 
to be clearly defined for participants without introducing any confounding effects such as a 
priming effect through the process of definition.  
 When constructing the IAT, several sources were consulted to establish the strongest 
possible approach. For the number of trials (stimuli for classification) and overall structure of 
the IAT, Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) advise seven blocks of trials for participants, 
and that Block 4 includes 40 trials, reducing order effects when switching categories (Nosek et 
al., 2005).  
Table 1: Outline structure of the Implicit Association Task (IAT) 
Block 
Number of 
Trials 
Left Key Response Right Key Response 
1 20 Category A Category B 
2 20 Good Bad 
3 20 Category A + Good Category B + Bad 
4 40 Category A + Good Category B + Bad 
5 40 Category B Category A 
6 20 Category B + Good Category A + Bad 
7 40 Category B + Good Category A + Bad 
 
Ordering of categories first with left or right key responses was randomised following advice 
from Nosek et al. (2005), and timing between trials set at 150ms (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
Stimuli 
Given the advised minimum of four items to represent a category in IATs (Nosek et al., 2005), 
five items per category were used. Using the Value Orientation measure (De Groot & Steg, 
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2008) as inspiration, a set of words was prepared to represent value constructs; for example, De 
Groot and Steg’s value “Influential: having an impact on people and events” (p. 337) led to our 
using the words “Reputation” and “Prestige” as stimuli connoting social power. Seven such 
words were chosen to reflect values for each category in pilot testing. Five words for Egoistic 
values and four for biospheric values came from De Groot and Steg’s (2008) questionnaire; the 
remainder came from consulting colleagues and thesauruses with a view to the words’ face 
validity. 
 Two important factors for IAT stimuli are valance and representation (Lane, Banaji, 
Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007): sets of stimuli must be of largely equal valance (positive or 
negative emotive connotations of the stimuli), and must clearly represent their intended 
categories. To evaluate the suitability of the draft stimuli, a pilot survey study was designed. 
Respondents were asked to rate each draft word using the ANEW methodology (Bradley & 
Lang, 1999), with each word rated on a nine-point scale for how Happy/Sad the word made 
them feel. Participants then classified words as either “Care for Yourself” or “Care for the 
Environment”, and were given space to discuss any complications they encountered. The 
sample for this pilot work was recruited online using social media website Reddit.com. Using 
online samples is becoming more popular in social sciences. Online samples – and Reddit.com 
in particular – have been found to increase diversity in participant samples, while maintaining 
good reliability and correlations with traditional laboratory samples (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 
2013; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). The pilot survey attracted 113 responses, though 
30 people failed to complete all tasks, leaving 83 valid responses. The stimuli pilot sample was 
mostly female (63.9%), with a mean age of 24.8 years (SD = 6.9).  
 Results indicated that words were strongly representative of their categories, with all 
words sorted into the expected category (care for self or care for environment) by at least 97% 
of respondents. No participants reported difficulties when categorising words. Valance results 
were collated, and two words for Egoistic values (“Authority” and “Dominance”) scored below 
the midpoint value of 5, suggesting negative valance. To compensate, two high-valance words 
for Biospheric values (“Environment” and “Renewable”) were removed, leaving two final sets 
of five stimuli. Valance of chosen items, and combined valance words are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Mean valance ratings (out of 9) for individual stimuli, and for general categories 
representing Egoistic and Biospheric values 
Egoistic Values   Biospheric Values 
(M = 5.54, SD = 1.52)   (M = 6.22, SD = 1.5) 
Item M SD  Item M SD 
Ambition 6.07 1.63  Recycle 6.12 1.58 
Prestige 5.65 1.68  Ecosystem 6.07 1.42 
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Money 5.17 1.64  Conservation 6.03 1.52 
Reputation 5.13 1.13  Natural 6.40 1.37 
Leadership 5.69 1.54   Sustainable 6.47 1.60 
 
Although Biospheric words have a slightly higher overall mean valance than Egoistic words, 
both sets contain only positively valenced items.   
For the attribute stimuli, measures of values are based on unipolar measures of 
importance, while implicit tasks predominantly use a bipolar measure of good/bad (Maio, 
2010). Some authors have suggested that implicit measures may employ more complex 
assessments, such as using “I like” or “I don’t like” to measure a respondent’s specific 
assessment of implicit stimuli (Olson & Fazio, 2004), and it may be possible to apply 
“important” or “unimportant” attributes in an implicit task. Investigating the effectiveness of 
the IAT using more complex attributes, however, increased the amount of conscious processing 
of test stimuli (Nosek & Hansen, 2008), reducing the value of the IAT as a measure of automatic 
preferences. In order to preserve automatic assessment of the stimuli, it was decided that the 
current approach would employ good/bad assessment. Conventional implicit methods use 
nouns or verbs (e.g., Love or Hate) to assign ratings, though there was a risk these could be 
confused with the target stimuli. To avoid confusion, adjectives were used for attribute stimuli 
(e.g., “Wonderful” or “Revolting”), and were differentiated from target stimuli by randomly 
using either blue or black fonts for each set (De Houwer, 2001) i.e., attribute words were 
coloured blue, with target words shown in black, or vice versa, for each participant. 
 The IAT as formulated here should provide a score of zero for a person equally 
balanced between Egoistic and Biospheric items, with a positive score in a person whose 
Biospheric-item preference outweighs their Egoistic-item preference, and a negative score 
showing the opposite pattern. Greenwald et al. (2003) provide guidelines for interpreting the 
magnitudes of IAT scores, roughly comparable to Cohen’s d effect size. Values more extreme 
than ±0.15 show implicit preferences greater than ‘small’, .35 for ‘medium’, and .60 for ‘large’.  
Validating Implicit Methods 
Based on Teige-Mocigemba et al. (2010), two approaches were selected to establish the validity 
of this new Environment IAT. First, IAT effects should be correlated, in part, with explicit 
measures. The relationship between implicit and explicit measures across a range of topics was 
found in a meta-analysis to fall around r =.24 (Hofmann et al., 2005), and a large-scale analysis 
of online reports found a relationship of r =.36 (Nosek, 2005). Both reports conclude that 
implicit approaches capture a related, but separate, construct to conventional explicit measures. 
For our Environment IAT, in which higher scores reflect a preference towards Biospheric 
values, we would thus expect negative correlations with explicit Egoistic values, and positive 
correlations with explicit Biospheric values of around this r ≈ .30 range. Ideally, the IAT should 
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also show non-significant or weakly positive correlations with explicit Altruistic values (De 
Groot & Steg, 2008). The Environment IAT should also positively correlate to some extent 
with unrelated measures of environmental worldviews, such as the NEP (Dunlap et al., 2000). 
 A second approach to validity is using known-group preferences, where groups are 
assumed to differ a priori on a chosen measure (Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2010). For this study, 
it was decided that membership of an environmental organisation (e.g., WWF or Greenpeace) 
would likely reflect stronger environmental values and so provide a group that should differ 
from non-members on the Environment IAT.  
Study 1 
For the first test, which was essentially a pilot study, a small and accessible sample was used 
to establish whether the method could demonstrate the desired effects. 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from two sources: undergraduate students taking part for course 
credits, and members of university environmental groups. A total of 42 participants were 
recruited; 18 were members of environmental groups (16 female, mean age = 20.71, SD = 1.61), 
and 24 were non-members (17 female, mean age = 18.75, SD = 0.68).  
Method 
Participants were informed they were completing a study on environmental attitudes and would 
take part in a reaction speed ‘game’. Participants completed the value orientation measure (De 
Groot & Steg, 2008), the NEP (Dunlap et al., 2000), and were asked their gender and age. 
Participants also indicated whether they were active members of, or donated money to, 
environmental groups (giving WWF and Greenpeace as examples). The IAT was constructed 
using E-Prime v.2.0.8 (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002), and explicit/implicit task 
order counterbalanced across participants, completed in a laboratory setting. 
Results 
Explicit measures were calculated, with good Cronbach’s alpha scores: NEP α = .80, Egoistic 
α = .77, Altruistic α = .83, and Biospheric α = .92. IAT scores were calculated using the 
Greenwald et al. (2003) D algorithm. Correlations are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Study 1 Correlation between explicit Values, NEP, and Environment IAT. * p<.05, **p<.01 
  Egoistic Altruistic Biospheric NEP 
Altruistic -.13    
Biospheric -.14 .58**   
NEP .09 .28 .55**  
IAT -.32* .31 .48* .36* 
 
11 
 
Mean NEP scores differed between the 18 environmentalists (M = 5.48, SD = 0.55) and 24 
non-environmentalists (M = 4.71, SD = 0.49) using an independent samples t-test, t(41) = 4.79, 
p < .001; the effect size was conventionally ‘large’, Hedge’s g = 1.46 (95% CI: 1.31, 1.62). 
 Group differences for explicit value importance were compared using independent 
samples t-tests. Egoistic values for environmentalists (M = 4.56, SD = 1.12) and non-
environmentalists (M = 5.29, SD = 1.22) were equivalent, t(40) = 1.96, p = .108, as were 
altruistic values for environmentalists (M = 7.67, SD = 1.10) and non-environmentalists (M = 
6.98, SD = 1.21), t(40) = 1.97, p = .056. Biospheric values for environmentalists (M = 7.82, SD 
= 1.12) were higher than non-environmentalists (M = 5.53, SD = 1.20), t(40) = 6.50, p<.001, 
with a conventionally ‘large’ effect size, Hedge’s g = 1.98 (95% CI: 1.63, 2.32).  
In keeping with this difference in explicit Biospheric values, comparison of IAT scores 
between environmentalists (M = 0.47, SD = 0.38) and non-environmentalists (M = -0.09, SD = 
0.40) was also significant, t(41) = 4.40, p<.001; environmentalists had a stronger implicit 
preference for Biospheric values than non-environmentalists. The effect size for this difference 
was also conventionally ‘large’, Hedge’s g = 1.4 (95% CI: 1.27, 1.52). All p-values have been 
corrected for multiple comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni method.  
Study 1 Discussion 
Study 1’s results demonstrate that using words relating to Biospheric or Egoistic values in an 
IAT produced significantly different scores between environmentalists and non-
environmentalists. Environmentalists, who had stronger explicit Biospheric values than non-
environmentalists, showed significantly stronger implicit preferences for Biospheric-value-
related words than for Egoistic-value-related words. IAT scores also correlated as expected 
with explicit measures: a negative link to Egoistic values, positive links to Biospheric values 
and the NEP, and a non-significant link to Altruistic values. 
Study 2 
Encouraged by results from Study 1, a second study was designed to replicate Study 1 in a 
larger and potentially more representative sample by using an online approach.  
Method 
Participants were recruited by advertising the study on social news site Reddit.com. The study 
was advertised as research on environmental issues, including a reaction speed ‘game’. 
Participants were directed to a website describing implicit attitudes and the purpose of the study. 
The website also acted as a counterbalancing mechanism: the link to take part in the study 
randomly assigned participants to either the implicit or explicit section first. The survey was 
identical to Study 1, with additional questions on respondents’ primary language and country 
of residence. English as first language was required to avoid confusion with words, and since 
there is some suggestion that language may influence IAT results (Ogunnaike, Dunham, & 
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Banaji, 2010). No monetary incentive was offered, but participants could receive feedback upon 
request. The online IAT was based upon a modified ‘Open Source, Web-based IAT’ JavaScript 
code (Mason & Allon, 2013). 
Participants 
In total, 154 participants attempted the study, though 33 respondents failed to complete one or 
other of the tasks, and 11 did not speak English as a first language, leaving 110 valid responses. 
Of the 110, 51 were female (46.4%) with a mean age of 25.7 years (SD = 9.3). As an internet 
sample, respondents were asked which country they were currently living in; 63% were from 
the USA, 15% from the UK, 7% from Canada, 3% each from Australia and the Netherlands, 
with remaining participants from Austria, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden 
and Switzerland. As in Study 1, participants were separated based on membership/contributions 
to environment groups. Twenty-eight participants were environmentalists (10 female, mean age 
=31.4, SD = 13.4) and 82 were non-environmentalists (41 women, mean age = 23.8, SD = 6.7). 
Results 
Explicit measures were calculated, with good Cronbach’s alpha reliability: NEP α = .87, 
Egoistic α = .74, Altruistic α = .84, and Biospheric α = .93. IAT scores were calculated using 
the Greenwald et al. (2003) D algorithm, and results correlated in Table 4. 
Table 4: Study 2 Correlation between explicit Values, NEP, and Environment IAT. * p<.05, **p<.01 
  Egoistic Altruistic Biospheric NEP 
Altruistic .01    
Biospheric -.03 .57**   
NEP -.30** .29** .59**  
IAT -.34* .24* .26** .28** 
 
NEP scores for the 28 environmentalists (M = 5.50, SD = 0.67) and 83 non-environmentalists 
(M = 4.72, SD = 0.90) using an independent samples t-test were significantly different, t(108) 
= 4.16, p <.001. Effect size was conventionally ‘large’, Hedge’s g = .91 (95% CI: 0.76, 1.1). 
 Group differences for explicit value importance were compared using independent 
samples t-tests. For Egoistic values, environmentalists (M = 4.60, SD = 1.06) and non-
environmentalists (M = 4.94, SD = 1.30) were equivalent, t(108) = 1.24, p = .432, and the same 
was found for Altruistic values (environmentalists M = 7.31, SD = 1.16; non-environmentalists 
M = 7.03, SD = 1.42) t(108) = 0.95, p = .346. Biospheric values for environmentalists (M = 
7.94, SD = 0.97) and non-environmentalists (M = 5.99, SD = 1.85) were significantly different, 
t(108) = 5.21, p<.001, with a conventionally ‘large’ effect size, Hedge’s g = 1.15 (95% CI: 
0.83, 1.46). 
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Comparing IAT scores for environmentalists (M = 0.36, SD = 0.41) and non-
environmentalists (M = 0.03, SD = 0.55) using an independent samples t-test found a significant 
difference, t(108) = 2.91, p = .012. Effect size was conventionally ‘medium’ to ‘large’: Hedge’s 
g = 0.63 (95% CI: 0.54, 0.73). Again all p-values were corrected. 
Study 2 Discussion 
Using a larger online sample, Study 2 replicated the difference in IAT scores between 
environmentalists and non-environmentalists, showing people who had made strong real-world 
environmental commitments also held implicit and explicit preferences for pro-Biospheric 
values. Compared to Study 1, results were more mixed, with smaller group differences on IAT 
and NEP measures, and weaker correlations between the IAT and explicit measures. This may 
be due to uncontrollable environments participants experienced when performing the online 
IAT: music, disturbances, or uncertainty of test parameters for example. Also, given the abstract 
nature of categories within the IAT, greater attention may be required to accurately categorise 
stimuli, which may also be influenced by such varied environments. However, results overall 
remain positive: the IAT correlations complied with our theoretical predictions, and medium to 
large differences in implicit preference were observed. 
Study 3 
With promising results from Study 1 and 2, a third sample was recruited to further test the 
validity of the Environment IAT. Although Study 2 provided a large sample with results that 
supported Study 1, and although online recruitment methods have received support (Casler et 
al., 2013; Goodman et al., 2013), a conventional recruitment approach may be required as an 
additional check of validity. To pre-empt any discussion that the online method may not provide 
sufficient support, a larger sample with physically present participants was sought. 
Method 
Using the online IAT described in Study 2, two sources of recruitment were used. First, staff 
within a UK university were recruited using advertisements for a new measure of 
environmental views, with an open prize draw for £10 vouchers as incentive. Second, visitors 
to a UK university open day were invited to take part; similar to Study 2, participants were 
informed they were taking part in a test of implicit preferences, given a link to randomly 
complete the explicit and implicit tasks in a counter-balanced order, and then offered the chance 
to receive feedback on their scores at a later date. The survey used the value orientation measure 
(De Groot & Steg, 2008) and the NEP (Dunlap et al., 2000), as well as recording age, gender, 
and membership status of environmental organisations, and the order of explicit/implicit tasks 
was counterbalanced.  
Participants 
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From the university staff sample, 37 participants completed the survey; 23 (62.2%) were female 
with a mean age of 31.8 years (SD = 8.3). The open day sample had 126 responses logged, 
though 23 failed to complete either the explicit or implicit sections. Of the 103 valid responses, 
74 (72.5%) were female, with a mean age of 28.3 years (SD = 15.9). Combining the samples 
led to a total of 140 people, 97 (69.3%) of whom were female, with a mean age of 29.3 (SD = 
14.4). Of the 140, 16 were members of environmental groups (mean age = 35, SD = 13.8, 12 
female) and 124 were non-members (mean age = 28.9, SD = 14.4, 87 female). 
Results 
Explicit measures showed good reliability: NEP α = .80, Egoistic α = .74, Altruistic α = .81, 
and Biospheric α = .91. The Greenwald et al. (2003) algorithm calculated D scores. Correlations 
are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Study 3 Correlations between explicit Values, NEP, and Environment IAT. * p<.05, **p<.01 
  Egoistic Altruistic Biospheric NEP 
Altruistic .26**    
Biospheric .13 .58*   
NEP -.22* .24* .41*  
IAT -.20* .09 .19* .28** 
 
Comparing NEP scores for the 16 environmentalists (M = 5.4, SD = 0.69) and 124 non-
environmentalists (M = 4.8, SD = 0.74), an independent samples t-test found a significant 
difference t(138) = 3.209, p = .008. The effect size was conventionally ‘large’, Hedge’s g = 
0.81 (95% CI: 0.69, 0.93). 
 Ratings of explicit values between groups were compared using independent samples 
t-tests. For Egoistic values, environmentalists (M = 4.39, SD = 1.14) and non-environmentalists 
(M = 5.26, SD = 1.22) were different, t(138) = 2.70, p = .024, with a conventionally ‘medium’ 
to ‘large’ effect size, Hedge’s g = 0.71 (95% CI: 0.51, 0.92). Altruistic values for 
environmentalists (M = 7.48, SD = 1.62) and non-environmentalists (M = 7.07, SD = 1.32) 
were not significantly different, t(108) =1.15, p = .253. Biospheric values for environmentalists 
(M = 7.39, SD = 1.61) and non-environmentalists (M = 6.16, SD = 1.64) were significantly 
different, t(108) = 2.83, p=.02, a conventionally ‘medium’ to ‘large’ effect size, Hedge’s g = 
0.75 (95% CI: 0.48, 1.02).  
Finally, IAT scores for environmentalists (M = 0.389, SD = 0.49) and non-
environmentalists (M = 0.015, SD = 0.55) were significantly different: t(138) = 2.58, p = .022, 
a conventionally ‘medium’ to ‘large’ effect size Hedge’s g = 0.68 (95% CI: 0.59,0.77). All p-
values are corrected for multiple comparisons. 
Combined Sample Analysis 
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For a general overview of the Environment IAT, and to increase sample size to improve 
statistical power, respondents from all three studies were combined into one dataset. In total, 
293 participants completed the IAT; 183 were female (62.5%) with a mean age of 26.5 years 
(SD = 11.9). The sample was divided into two groups: environmentalists (n = 60, 60.7% female, 
mean age = 28.9, SD = 12.4) and non-environmentalists (n = 233, 62% female, mean age = 
25.9, SD = 11.7). Using the combined sample of all participants, logistic regression analysis 
was used to predict environmentalist status. Five predictors were included in the model: each 
of the three explicit value orientations from De Groot and Steg (2008), NEP score (Dunlap et 
al., 2000), and the Environment IAT effect. Using a stepwise (Forward Likelihood Ratio) 
approach to determine predictor strength using data-driven criteria, results from the logistic 
regression are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Combined sample (N = 294) logistic regression predicting environmentalist status, * = p<.05, 
** = p<.001. Pseudo-R2 = .26 (Cox & Snell), .40 (Nagelkerke), Final model fit Χ2(4) = 85.45, p <.001 
 B S.E. Wald Exp (B)  Low 95% High 95% 
Step 1       
Biospheric 0.82 0.13 37.46** 2.27 1.75 2.96 
Constant -7.13 1.02 49.01** 0.00   
Step 2       
Biospheric 0.85 0.14 39.22** 2.34 1.79 3.05 
Egoistic -0.61 0.15 16.06** 0.54 0.40 0.73 
Constant -4.38 1.15 14.57** 0.01   
Step 3       
Biospheric 0.80 0.14 34.19** 2.22 1.70 2.89 
Egoistic -0.55 0.16 12.49** 0.58 0.42 0.78 
IAT 1.04 0.37 7.79** 2.83 1.36 5.86 
Constant -4.50 1.14 15.57** 0.01   
Step 4       
Biospheric 0.67 0.15 20.74** 1.94 1.46 2.59 
Egoistic -0.47 0.16 8.49** 0.63 0.46 0.86 
IAT 0.99 0.38 6.73** 2.68 1.27 5.65 
NEP 0.65 0.30 4.81* 1.92 1.07 3.44 
Constant -7.34 1.76 17.37** 0.00     
 
Logistic regression results suggest the best predictors of environmentalist status, in decreasing 
order of strength, were Biospheric values, Egoistic values, IAT score, and finally the NEP. In 
the final model, 47.5% of environmentalists were correctly identified, and 95.2% of non-
environmentalists accurately identified. Environmentalists made up only 20% of the sample, so 
the 47.5% correct classification demonstrates the model has truly identified aspects of the 
measures that predict environmental commitment better than chance.  
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As an additional test, the Environment IAT was assessed as a unique predictor of 
environmentalist status, after accounting for variation explained by the conventional measures 
of all three value orientations and NEP scores. A binary logistic regression model, predicting 
environmentalist status, was run in two steps: Step 1 included NEP and the 3 value orientations 
measures as predictors, and the second added the Environment IAT as a predictor, to assess the 
possible improvement of the model. The Step 1 model showed a significant fit of Χ2(4) = 84.39, 
p <.001, pseudo-R2 = .25 (Cox & Snell), .40 (Nagelkerke). Adding IAT in Step 2 showed a 
significant increase in model fit (ΔΧ2 = 7.01, p = .008), with an overall model fit of Χ2(5) = 
91.40, p <.001, pseudo-R2 = .27 (Cox & Snell), .43 (Nagelkerke). The analysis indicates that 
the Environment IAT is a unique predictor of environmentalist status even after accounting for 
the conventional measures of environmental preferences using value orientations and 
environmental worldviews. 
General Discussion 
This paper describes the design and validation of an implicit measure based on environmental 
values. The Environment Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) is based 
upon the theoretical framework by Stern and colleagues (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern et al., 1993) 
identifying three value orientations linked to environmental behaviour: Egoistic, Altruistic, and 
Biospheric values. De Groot and Steg (2007, 2008) developed a reliable explicit measure of 
these three value orientations, which inspired a set of original stimuli for the Environment IAT 
developed here. Stimuli were evaluated to ensure that IAT items strongly represented the 
opposing value orientations of Egoistic and Biospheric values, and had limited valance 
imbalance. Using the IAT across three separate studies, medium to large differences in implicit 
preferences were found between actively committed environmentalists and non-
environmentalists, and IAT effects correlated as predicted with explicit measures of values and 
with environmental worldviews. When predicting membership of environmental organisations, 
the implicit approach proved a significant predictor of who was and was not a member of an 
environmental group, even after controlling for explicit values and attitudes. 
 When developing their value orientation measure, De Groot and Steg (2008) noted that 
Biospheric and Egoistic values may have opposing influences on environmentally sustainable 
behaviour, given their representation of Schwartz’s (1992) polarised self-enhancement/self-
transcendence value orientations. In all three studies presented here, IAT scores (where higher 
scores indicate a preference for the environment over the self) were negatively correlated with 
explicit Egoistic values, and positively correlated with explicit Biospheric values, supporting 
the Egoistic/Biospheric contrast. Additionally, IAT scores were not significantly correlated 
with explicit Altruism scores in Study 1 and 3, and were positively correlated in Study 2. De 
Groot and Steg (2008) demonstrated that Altruistic and Biospheric values are separate but 
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closely linked, indicating that the IAT successfully differentiated between Altruistic and 
Biospheric values in two of the studies, but remained linked to Altruistic values in Study 2. 
Also, IAT results in all three samples showed positive correlations with the NEP, measuring a 
person’s explicit environmental worldview (Dunlap et al., 2000). The positive correlation with 
a secondary measure gives additional support to the IAT, suggesting that it measures some 
shared variance between implicit preferences and explicit views. Validation of the IAT was 
also found in its ability to identify group differences. Using membership of an environmental 
organisation (e.g., Greenpeace or WWF) for categorisation, the three studies showed that 
environmentalists held stronger implicit preferences for environmental values than the general 
population – a clear example of criterion validity. Calculating effect size between groups and 
using Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, the difference in implicit preference was conventionally 
‘medium’ to ‘large’ in all three samples.  
 Conventional explicit approaches using the value orientation measure (De Groot & 
Steg, 2008) and the NEP (Dunlap et al., 2000) both performed well, showing medium to large 
effect size differences between the groups. In the combined analysis of all participants (n = 
293), the three explicit value orientations, IAT scores, and NEP scores were included in a 
logistic regression to predict membership of environmental groups. When controlling for 
explicit value measures, the IAT remained a significant predictor of environmentalist status, 
supporting the validity of using the Environment IAT approach to capture additional variation 
within behaviour over and above what can be captured through explicit methods (Greenwald et 
al., 2009). Additionally, the explicit value measure for Altruism was not a significant predictor 
of group status, again supporting the idea that Biospheric values are a separate construct, 
uniquely linked to environmentalism and not merely a manifestation of more general concern 
for others (De Groot & Steg, 2007, 2008; Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern et al., 1993). It also appears 
that, while explicit Biospheric and Egoistic values were the strongest predictors of group 
membership, the IAT outperformed the NEP measure in predictive utility. Reviews of IAT 
results, in a variety of spheres, conclude that they capture a separate, but related, component of 
attitudes and behaviour when compared to explicit measures (Greenwald et al., 2009; Hofmann 
et al., 2005; Nosek et al., 2005) – an idea demonstrated again here.  
 The current results support using De Groot and Steg’s (2007, 2008) value orientation 
measure in future research, as explicit values measured using this instrument appear to be the 
strongest predictor of environmentalist status and so will likely prove to be the best predictor 
of environmental behaviour more generally. However, we suggest that de Groot and Steg’s 
measure could now be supplemented by our Environment IAT to identify additional links to 
behaviour that the explicit measures does not measure. Although the NEP was a significant 
predictor of group membership, investigations comparing NEP and value differences indicate 
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that values can also act as a stronger predictor of intentions for environmental behavioural, 
personal norms, and policy acceptability (Steg et al., 2011).  
 More generally, the results presented here demonstrate that it is possible to apply value-
based stimuli when measuring implicit preferences. However, we cannot fully state that the 
Environment IAT is an implicit measure of values. Maio (2010) previously suggested implicit 
measures of values were possible, but his review also described the complication with using 
Good/Bad assessments of implicit measures when values are defined by measurement of 
importance/unimportance. The Environment IAT developed here gives a person’s relative level 
of preference between the two extremes of Egoistic and Biospheric values at an implicit level, 
but additional work is required before confidently stating that the method does measure 
personal values. Despite consistent and clear correlations with the explicit value measures 
(which assessed the importance of values for the participant), and with group differences found, 
additional work is needed to assess using value-based stimuli in implicit tasks. 
There is a range of options that application of this new Environment IAT method might 
open, with two broad areas briefly considered here: predicting behaviour and understanding 
psychological processes. Greenwald et al. (2009) argue that IAT measures are more useful 
when a topic is socially sensitive and, given the concern for self-presentation biases when 
measuring environmental views (Ewert & Galloway, 2009; Hafner et al., in prepA), the 
Environment IAT is ideally placed for investigative use of this construct. Although the concept 
of detecting “Green Fakers” (Beattie & Sale, 2009, p. 203), who hide their true beliefs, is an 
interesting concept, the IAT is not so much a method of identifying ‘true’ beliefs as though it 
were some kind of lie detector, but rather a measure reflecting automatic and possibly 
inaccessible (rather than hidden) beliefs (Nosek et al., 2007, p. 282). The Environment IAT 
could therefore provide unique insight into people with conflicting implicit and explicit 
preferences, evaluating whether certain specific behaviours are better linked to or predicted by 
implicit or explicit measures. For example, choosing to publicly recycle one’s waste may be a 
socially sensitive act that could be explored (Barr, 2007), or even observing how an individual’s 
uncontrolled eye movements relates to carbon-labels on commercial products (Hafner, Walker, 
Verplanken & Skippon, in prepB). 
The Environment IAT could also explore the psychological concepts behind attitudes, 
decisions, and behaviour. A developing area of interest is the examination of sceptics’ attitudes 
to climate change, and the Environment IAT may further assist investigations. For example, 
Corner, Whitmarsh, and Xenias (2012) presented sceptics and non-sceptics with fake 
newspaper articles that challenged or supported climate change, and observed how both groups 
developed bias against opposing views. Corner et al. (2012) also asked participants to state 
whether their views had changed from reading opposing views, but found little explicit 
evidence of ‘polarisation’ – a strengthening of personal opinion when challenged by external 
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views. The Environment IAT could evaluate how implicit environmental views may change 
when presented with new information, and whether automatic polarisation occurs, even when 
not explicitly shown. Previous work demonstrates that even after negative information on 
fictional social subgroups is corrected, people maintain implicit biases against the subgroup, 
while explicitly revising their evaluations (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). This could also 
extend to how environmentalist subgroups or individuals are viewed: implicit evaluations of 
people are automatic and can develop into explicit biases (Ranganath & Nosek, 2008), and IAT 
predictive utility increases when predicting social-group judgements (Greenwald et al., 2009).  
 The current approach using Egoistic/Biospheric values offers a novel approach toward 
IAT stimuli than previous measures, such as using low/high carbon products (Beattie & Sale, 
2009) or natural/built stimuli (Schultz et al., 2004). A pilot study to evaluate potential stimuli 
was used to create two representative and positively valenced sets of stimuli – vital factors 
within IAT design (Lane et al., 2007; Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2010). However, the stimuli 
employed were not perfectly balanced and Biospheric stimuli were rated at a slightly higher 
valance than Egoistic words. But even with slightly imbalanced valance, results from the 
Environment IAT were consistent, theoretically sound, and predictive of actual behaviour. 
Improvements to the stimuli could certainly be made in the future, and additional work on 
designing a stronger set of stimuli may further enhance Environment IAT effects. 
 In all three studies, environmentalists showed stronger implicit preference for the 
environment than people who had not joined an environmental organization. The Environment 
IAT could also explore the opposite to those Biospheric-focused people who join environmental 
organizations: those with stronger Egoistic orientations. Egoistic values relate to self-
enhancement constructs that include ambition, power, and money (Schwartz, 1994), values 
linked to politically right-wing voters across 20 European countries (Piurko, Schwartz, & 
Davidov, 2011). Applying the Environment IAT to members of right-wing political groups 
could provide an alternative approach to calibrating the Environment IAT, and would 
theoretically demonstrate stronger pro-Egoistic views. 
One potential issue seen from the current results was the variation in correlations 
between implicit and explicit measures of environmental preferences: Study 1 laboratory tasks 
showed a stronger relationship than Study 2’s online sample of Study 3’s open day/office 
sample. As it may be that the uncontrolled environments (e.g. noise) presented interference 
with reaction-speed tasks, the variation in correlation strength should be considered in future 
work. One possible confound is the time of year that each study took place. Examining the time 
period that studies were undertaken, Study 1 was run in autumn, and Studies 2 and 3 were run 
in summer. Typically pleasant seasons, such as autumn, are associated with stronger implicit 
preferences for nature (Duffy & Verges, 2010), but no link between summer and implicit 
preferences has been observed. It may be the case that autumn induces more positive 
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associations to the environment that summer – possibly because the changing of leaves in 
autumn is a visual and pleasant reminder of nature, whereas the heat of summer is not directly 
related to perceptions of nature itself – although this is purely speculative and requires 
evaluation. Nonetheless, the differences in correlations between implicit and explicit 
environmental preferences across the studies may be linked to seasonal variations, and should 
be considered in future work. 
  
Conclusions 
Using the orientations of Egoistic and Biospheric values is a successful approach to designing 
stimuli for use in implicit methods. The Environment IAT detected large differences between 
committed environmentalists and the general population, showed expected correlations with 
explicit measures, and was a unique predictor of environmentalist status even after controlling 
for explicit measures of values and attitudes. The Environment IAT offers a new approach to 
exploring environmentally sustainable behaviours, as well as understanding views and 
preferences relating to sustainability and climate change. Future work may expand implicit 
approaches to other value orientations, and hopefully validate this approach to other fields. 
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